A brief review of the current status of marine and offshore safety regulations in the UK is outlined. Several issues pertaining to the problems encountered in applying the existing reliability and safety analysis methods in quantitative safety appraisal studies, especially in the early concept design stage of marine and offshore engineering products, are discussed. In this paper, four novel risk assessment and decision support frameworks are presented. These include a design trade-off approach using the Taguchi method, a safety-based decision support system based on artificial neural network techniques, a fuzzy-logic-based synthesis incorporating the Dempster-Shafer approach for multiple attribute decision-making, and an integration of approximate reasoning approach and evidential reasoning method for design evaluation. Four illustrative examples are used to demonstrate the novel tools, together with the discussion on the conditions under which each approach may be applied effectively. Finally, recommendations on further development in subjective safety modelling, decisionmaking techniques and their integration into a safety management system are suggested.
INTRODUCTION

S
afety cases have been applied in aerospace, chemical and nuclear industries for the past two decades. Following the public inquiry led by Lord Cullen into the Piper Alpha accident of July 6, 1988 which claimed 167 lives, a safety case approach was only introduced to the UK offshore industry 3 . The report of the Cullen enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster led to a change of policy on offshore safety, replacing prescriptive rules with a goal-setting approach. In the UK offshore sector there has been a major change in philosophy in recent years, which has opened up the way for innovative thinking.
The UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) with the assistance of the HSE, has published the industry guidelines on a framework for risk related decision support 21 . The proposed framework could be useful for a wide range of applications under various conditions. The guidelines describe a generic framework which is able to help the decision maker in identifying the decision context and choosing appropriate bases for decision making. The proposed framework provides a means to assess the relative importance of codes and standards, good practice, engineering judgement, risk analysis, cost benefit analysis, company values and social values when making a decision. It is an appropriate basis on which to improve decision making and will result in a more transparent process to the wider public.
The mainstay of the regulations is the Health and Safety at Work Act. In 1992 a draft of the offshore installations (safety case) regulations was produced. The modifications were processed upon public consultation and opinion. The regulations came into force at the end of May 1993 for new installations, and November 1993 for existing installations.
A safety case covers all standards for the management of health and safety and the control of major hazards of the process in question and specifies how the risk involved are to be managed and minimised. It is subject to formal acceptance by the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) 3, 5 . Offshore operators should submit operational safety cases for all existing and new offshore installations to the Offshore Safety Division of the HSE. The case must feature suitable use of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) as part of the demonstration of the adequacy of preventive and protective measures.
After several years' field experience on the application of the offshore safety case approach in the UK, the safety case regulations were amended in 1996 to include the verification of safety-critical elements. The offshore installations and wells (design and construction, etc) regulations 1996 (DCR 1996) were introduced to deal with various stages of the life cycle of the installation 6 . An appropriate combination of inherent safe design, prevention, detection, control and mitigation measures should be implemented, maintained and verified throughout the life-cycle of the installation.
The main feature of the UK new offshore safety regulations is the absence of a prescriptive regime and defining specific duties of the operator and definition as regard to what are adequate means. The regulations set forth a high-level safety objective while placing responsibilities in the industry to set out and justify their basis for managing the risks of offshore operations. This is in recognition of the fact that hazards related to an individual installation are specific to its function and site conditions.
In 1993, the UK proposed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that formal safety assessment (FSA) should be applied to ships to ensure a strategic oversight of safety and pollution prevention. Since then, the UK has been actively involved in the application of FSA to the IMO rule-making process. FSA is a process that involves hazards identification, risk assessment, studying alternative ways of managing those risks, carrying out cost-benefit assessment of alternative management options, and finally making decisions on which option to select 11 .
QUANTITATIVE SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROBLEMS
Maritime and offshore safety analysis is a very complicated subject where safety is determined by numerous factors including human error. Many safety assessment techniques currently used in the maritime and offshore industries are comparatively mature tools. However, in many circumstances, the application of these tools may not be suitable or give unsatisfactory results due to the lack of applicable safety related data or the high level of uncertainty involved in the safety data available. Novel safety analysis methods are therefore required to identify major hazards and assess the associated risks in a more rational way in various environments where mature tools cannot be effectively or efficiently applied. The literature search carried out by the investigators indicates that although some work has been conducted in this area, no formal safety-based decision support tools have been developed and applied to a stable environment in the maritime and offshore industry. Safety-based decision support techniques may help designers in determining where risk reduction actions are required, defining appropriate risk reduction measures and reducing cost without increased risks to the maritime and offshore products.
In recent years, quantitative safety assessment techniques have been increasingly developed and applied by both safety analysts and designer engineers. However, there are still some limitations for these techniques to be widely and effectively applied to provide useful solutions to safety-based decision making, especially in the concept design stage 20 . This is due to the following problems as discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.
Under prevailing circumstances, only limited or no previous operational experience exists, in particular for systems with a high level of innovation. In many cases only limited data is available on system failures for which the statistical accuracy is usually poor. It may be difficult to obtain failure information encompassing the effects of human factors in system reliability with confidence. This is particularly true for maritime engineering systems.
The general procedure of single-objective linear programming is to optimise an objective function by setting a series of constraints equations. Obviously this single-objective representation has limitations in solving actual real-world problems due to their multiple-objectives attributes. Most often design-decision evaluation and safety assessments involve multiple objectives and constraints; this requires some compromise mechanisms to achieve the optimal solution in a rational, logical and consistent manner. Classical (crisp) mathematics, which is dichotomous in character, may be difficult to apply to these problems having a high level of uncertainties in terms of fuzziness and incompleteness, which always involve human factors, for example vagueness in human perception, subjectivity, attitudes, goals and conceptions.
It is extremely difficult to generate a mathematical model to represent and describe the safety behaviour/discipline of a maritime or offshore engineering system, as safety is a multiple-level and multiple-variable problem. There are many instances where Novel risk assessment and decision support techniques for safety management systems causes of an accident involved operational procedures, human error and decisions taken by designer and management. In other words, the safety of a system is affected by various factors such as design, manufacturing, installation, commissioning, operations and maintenance.
The fuzzy multiple-objective technique has been well established by mathematicians; however, design-decision evaluation is typically a fuzzy process and most of the objective functions reflect human factors, which are qualitative variables. In actual system safety management and design-decision evaluation, most problems consist of a combination of qualitative or linguistic variables and quantitative objective functions. Therefore, conventional mathematics has difficulty in dealing with these sorts of problems as it cannot effectively solve problems combining both quantitative and qualitative objective functions.
One of the main limitations associated with conventional methods, such as PRA, is the utilisation of a probability measure to evaluate uncertainty. Therefore, much effort is required in defining and establishing probability distribution for each contributing risk factor using historical data in estimating relative frequencies. Since each new marine or offshore project is affected by different risk factors associated with a high level of innovation, accurate knowledge of relative frequencies cannot be assumed from another project, as would be possible in other industries, such as manufacturing, where events have a repetitive nature.
Uncertainty can be broadly classified into three categories, namely fuzziness, incompleteness and randomness 25 . However, most analysts take it for granted that uncertainty is a model associated with randomness. In the appropriate circumstances, probability theory can be a powerful tool; however, many times the type of uncertainty encountered in maritime projects does not fit the axiomatic basis of probability theory simply because uncertainty in these projects is usually caused by the inherent fuzziness of the parameter estimate rather than randomness. Uncertainty involved in real world situations is often relating to the knowledge of systems rather than depending on chance.
A complete quantitative safety assessment involves a lot of analytical and computation work and is therefore very costly. It is extremely difficult to quantify the effects and consequences of hazards as they involve too many factors with a high level of uncertainty, even in those cases where the physical processes are clearly understood.
A large number of assumptions, judgements and opinions are involved subjectively in risk quantification process. Therefore, it may require considerable skill for a safety analyst to interpret the results produced.
It should be noted that there can be significant uncertainties in the information and factors that are involved in the decisionmaking process as discussed above. The decision-making process may be further complicated by considering the implications of cost estimates, time-scales, risks, safety benefits, the assessment of stakeholder views and perceptions, etc. The application of common sense is essential to ensure any uncertainties are recognised and addressed consistently.
NOVEL SAFETY ASSESSMENT APPROACHES
In view of the difficulties outlined and discussed, it is necessary to develop more novel methods in order to ensure that the safety can be integrated into the design process at the early concept design stage. This paper describes four novel safety assessment and decision-making tools that can be used to support the application of formal safety assessment of maritime and offshore products for safety management system. These include:
1. Design trade-off situations involving expert judgements based on the Taguchi method. 2. A safety based decision support system using artificial neural network techniques. 3. A fuzzy-logic-based synthesis incorporating the Dempster Shafer approach for making multiple-attribute decision. 4. An integration of approximate reasoning approach and evidential reasoning method in design evaluation.
Design trade-off situations involving expert judgements based on the Taguchi method
Taguchi methods of robust experimental design have traditionally been employed in manufacturing settings 14 . Literature review indicates that there appears to be virtually no study that uses Taguchi experimental design to optimise a safety-based decision-support study in any discipline of engineering applications 18 . Beyond the original intention of Taguchi to apply his methods to manufacturing settings, there are other reasons perceived why Taguchi methods have not been employed at all in safety-based decision-making study. Firstly, the safety of a system is very difficult to measure precisely or quantitatively. This induces problems in the application of Taguchi methods as they actually depend heavily on the accurate measurement of variation of 'quantified' parameters of a process. Secondly, the outcome of a safety-based decision-making problem is inherently much more inconsistent in quality than its manufacturing counterpart. This is primarily due to the fact that the safety performance of a system depends largely on the behaviour of the human involvement. High variation in quality makes it difficult to make bona fide judgements about the system performance since Taguchi methods rely on only a small part of the total information pertaining to variations. Finally, safety-related problems, generally speaking, have more 'noise' factors associated with them compared with their manufacturing counterparts. Despite these attributes of a safety-related problem, the example given in this paper has demonstrated that by appropriately identifying a 'quantitative' measure of safety, Taguchi's concepts of robust designs can be employed successfully to optimise safety-related decision-making problems. This may provide an alternative tool for safety analysts, designers, regulatory bodies and managers to conduct decision making with confidence in situations where other methods cannot be effectively applied.
A safety optimisation framework using Taguchi concepts A safety optimisation framework using Taguchi concepts for maritime safety engineering applications is presented in this section. The proposed framework consists of the following steps:
1. Define the problem. The first step is to describe the specific maritime safety problem in detail, either in qualitative or quantitative terms. Then define the objective parameter that is to be optimised.
Identify factors and their interactions.
Brainstorming technique is normally used among a panel of experts to identify all the possible factors, levels, their
Novel risk assessment and decision support techniques for safety management systems interactions and other pertinent information about the optimisation problem. Sometimes, factor screening may be required to provide a quick and simple way of ranking factors according to their importance in the optimisation. This will reduce the number of identified factors in order to perform the optimisation more efficiently. 3. Select an appropriate orthogonal array.
In order to select the correct standard orthogonal array, it is necessary to determine the total degrees of freedom in order to find the minimum number of level combinations to be tested. The number of factors and their interactions as identified after the screening in step 2 will determine the total degrees of freedom. 4. Conduct experiment.
This starts with the selection of a correct quality loss function to represent the description of loss attributed in the case. This is a purely mathematical analysis and S/N-ratio for each treatment is calculated according to the selected standard S/N-ratio expressions. The calculated S/N-ratios are then normalised before proceeding to the next step. 5. Conduct analysis of variance (ANOVA) and other Taguchi related analysis. This step mainly performs all the relevant operations in ANOVA. The main effects of each factor as well as interaction of factors are determined, then sum of squares for each main effect of factor is computed. The variance of each factor is calculated. The results are presented in a table. 6. Identify significant factors and their interactions.
The contribution of each factor and their interactions are determined through division, ie, the sum of square of each factor is divided by the total sum of squares of all the factors. Pooling is recommended when a factor is determined to be insignificant by performing a test of significance against the error term at a desired confidence level. 7. Find the optimal combination of factor levels to minimise system risk level.
The non-linearity analysis is carried out to investigate the non-linearity of the S/Nratio with respect to factor levels of each factor, as well as their interactions, to identify the optimal combination of factor levels. The non-linearity graphs are developed to demonstrate the outcomes of this investigation. 8. Recommend for implementation.
Safety related recommendations pertaining to engineering design, operation and management are made based on the outcomes of the optimisation.
The above procedure will be illustrated through an example that will be described later. The requirement for a verification experiment is essential to identify and assess the validity of the results obtained against those known judgements made by the experts, even though it is not performed in the example given in this paper. However, a verification experiment is to be made by presenting the optimum combination obtained to the experts.
An Example: application of taguchi concepts in maritime safety studies A hypothetical example is designed by the authors for illustration purposes to demonstrate that the Taguchi method is a potential tool for maritime engineering safety studies. The example illustrates how the Taguchi method can be used to extract from expert judgements which factors the experts judge as most important when they estimate the risk level for a ship with the purpose of determining insurance rates. This method can be used wherever a design trade-off is combined with subjective expert judgement.
The ship's safety is substantially affected by many factors including shipowner management quality, crew operation quality, enhanced survey programme, degree of machinery redundancy, fire-fighting capability, navigation equipment level, corrosion control, preventive maintenance policy, etc 2 . In order to identify the salient factors and interactions that cause excessive variations, a trial application of Taguchi methods is performed to optimise each factor to attain the optimal safety for the ship.
Varying levels of various factors such as design features, shipowner management quality, crew operation quality, etc, have different degrees of influence on a ship's overall safety performance throughout its life-cycle. This will further be complicated when all these factors are evaluated simultaneously to obtain the optimised solution. The prime objective of this study is to help in identifying the factors and their associated reasons for high risks and to suggest measures, including exact parameters settings, that would reduce the overall risk level of the ship.
Brainstorming technique is used to gather relevant information to determine factors affecting a ship's safety. The resulting list of significant factors affecting ship safety is given in Table 1 . These factors are determined based on the information acquired. In the eight factors, seven have three levels, and one has two levels. There will be a significant interaction between two factors, namely, the shipowner management quality and enhanced survey programme. Novel risk assessment and decision support techniques for safety management systems
The risk level values between 1 and 50 are assigned by experts to each factor at each level. The higher the risk level value, the more risky is the system. These risk level values do not represent any absolute or exact degree of risk encountered by the ship and they are used only for relatively indicative purposes. To facilitate further discussion, the factors are assigned alphabet-identifiers. Based on the analysis using the proposed safety optimisation framework, the optimal combination of factor levels to minimise system risk level (ie that yield the largest value of S/N-ratio) is determined to be as follows: 2 and H 1 , provide the best combination for the lowest possible risk level for the whole system. Keeping in mind that factors C and G are not significant, the management must keep factors A, B, D, E, F, H at the optimal levels in order to reduce risk level of the ship to the maximum extent.
As a result of the above study, the following changes are recommended in the design, operation and management system: q Average level of preventive maintenance policy should be adopted. Factor A 2 is made operative. q High degree of machinery redundancy is recommended.
Factor B 1 is more preferable. q Average fire-fighting capability is adequate for the system. Factor C 2 is selected. q Shipowner management quality should be high. Factor D 1 is strongly urged. q Enhanced survey programme should be adopted. Factor E 1 is strongly urged. q Low navigation equipment is adequate. Factor F 3 is selected. q Average corrosion control is recommended. Factor G 2 is selected. q Competent crew operation quality is essential. Factor H 1 is strongly recommended. The major difficulties of this method, however, lie in maintaining the high level of response and reaching and implementing a consensus in pooling experts' opinions in the first place in brainstorming sessions. However, Delphi method can be used for structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of experts as a whole to deal with complex problems.
A safety-based decision support system using artificial neural network (ANN) techniques
One advantage of ANNs is their ability to analyse large quantities of data to establish patterns and characteristics in situations where mathematical relationships are not available or far from desired accuracy, or where information and knowledge available are not adequate to allow conventional statistical techniques to be applied. Owing to recognising and learning abilities, ANNs can be applied to predicting and decision-making problems that were once reserved for multi-variate statistical analysis. ANNs are capable of discovering the relationship, whereas regression/discriminant analysis requires knowledge of the nature of the underlying relationship 22 . Another feature of ANNs is that they are fault-tolerant as they can adapt to incomplete or 'noisy' data, which makes them suitable for difficult applications such as pattern recognition. In another sense this means that the contribution made by any single processing element is not too important. Hence, even when there are missing elements in the sample data, the result/performance of the ANNs is not affected in a significant way. Furthermore, the ANNs can estimate both quantitative variables (interval and ratio scale variables) and class variables (nominal variables). They are also suitable to be employed for forecasting, predicting and classification purposes.
The recently-developed software products or tools of ANNs show great promise and convenience to analyse problems where there are no immediately obvious relationships between input and output data. Once an ANN has been trained to give acceptable results, it can then produce the desired output with relatively simple and straightforward manipulation to the input.
The ANNs approach, also referred to as connectionism or parallel distributed processing, adopts a 'rain metaphor' of information processing 8 . Under the ANNs approach, information processing occurs through interaction involving large numbers of simulated neurons. This simulated neuron or unit has the following four important components: q Input connections (synapses), through which the unit receives activation from other units. q A summation function that combines the various input activations into a single activation. q A threshold function that converts this summation of input activation into output activation. q Output connections by which a unit's output activation arrives as input activation at other units in the system. Regardless of what network algorithm, architecture, transfer function or learning rule one selects when designing and developing an ANN model, the general approach is always the same. The success depends upon a clear understanding of the actual problem, since a complete understanding of the problem to be solved by the ANNs is paramount. It is necessary to process input and output data by using some normalisation methods before applying the training sets 4, 13 . ANNs learn by examples and cannot be programmed in the traditional sense. Most of the 'black magic' in ANNs come in defining and preparing the training input set. Since ANNs are pattern matchers, the representation of the data contained in the training sets is critical to the successful solution by the ANNs. The data sets, including the input training set and the desired output, should be as orthogonal as possible, that is, the variables contained in the data sets should be independent with no correlation. Once problem description and data for training sets preparation are done, the rest of the development of the ANN will simply fall into place. The logic on selection of training algorithms and number of nodes in input, hidden and output are discussed in the case-study later. ANN testing is performed with data never seen before by the network.
The risk estimation framework incorporating ANNs comprises the following steps:
Step 1: Collect data. Collect data sets, number series or system information that have a relationship or influence to a system failure, from relevant sources such as classification societies, shipowners, flag states, insurance companies and expert input.
Step 2: Prepare data. Define and prepare training input sets and decide on how to handle the gathered information for presentation to the ANNs. Determine the range of data and set minimum and maximum values to these levels. This makes processing more efficient by focusing the network's attention on the pertinent data.
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Step 3: Extract test data set. In order to be able to test the trained network, it is common to set aside some of the data set for testing. Therefore, the total data set is divided into two different sets, one for training and the other for testing.
Step 4: Train the network. Select suitable network architecture and algorithm to train the network. Networks can have various number of layers; the number of neurons in the hidden layers can vary from one to several hundred. There are several algorithms/methods of training that can be used with any particular architecture. For specific problems, some may work better than others. Apply training data to a particular architecture and training algorithm. This adjusts the weights, which connect the neurons, in such a way that the network makes good predictions when presented with that or similar data sets.
Step 5: Test the ANN. Apply the test data sets to the trained ANN model to test its performance.
Step 6: Evaluate the ANN model. If the risk estimation generated by the model lies within acceptable accuracy then proceed to next step. Otherwise repeat Steps 2 to 6 all over again until the risk estimation produced falls within an acceptable accuracy margin. For various applications, accuracy level requirements would be different and are judged subjectively by the user.
Step 7: Use the ANN model to carry out risk prediction. Feed to the ANN model with new casualty data, information to perform risk estimation.
Step 8: The risk estimation or prediction generated by the ANN model can be applied to safety-based design and operation support system as a source of expert input.
An example to demonstrate ANNs approach
This research has focused on whether it is possible to evaluate the susceptibility of a particular ship design and predict or forecast the potential risk. The risk estimation framework incorporating ANNs as proposed and described above is used to generate ANN models for risk analysis in this section.
An ANN was developed as an aid in understanding the relationship among the different parameters or features of a generic type of vessel, such as vessel's size, age, degree of machinery redundancy, external factors, etc. Once this relationship is understood, it could be used in predicting vessel failure. A fast back-propagation ANN in the MATLAB Neural Network toolbox, developed by the Math works Inc, is chosen as the software package. MATLAB Neural Network uses a sigmoid function as the activation function, therefore all data must be scaled between 0 and 1.0. In this case a tan-sigmoid transfer function is chosen for the hidden layer, and a linear transfer function, purelin for computing the network output.
The configuration of the ANN is shown in Fig 1. There are two nodes on the input layer corresponding to the amplitudes for the vessel's size and age. After performing a series of experiments on the effects of number of hidden neurons on training epoch, ten nodes are selected on the hidden layer to allow for the nonlinearity of the problem. The output layer has one node corresponding to the amplitude for hull failure rate.
Artificial neural networks model
The model of the artificial neural networks consists of one input layer of two neurons, which represent the deadweight (dwt) and age of typical bulk carriers. Table 2 outlines the major neural network characteristics. 
Training the ANN
Training pairs must be selected for training the ANN. For this network, a training pair is a set of known input and output values. To train the network, an output value is computed from the known input values and the random weights. This computed output is then compared to the known output. A change in the weight is computed and propagated back through the ANN. The modified weights are then used with the known inputs to compute another output value. This process continues until the sum-squared error (sse) difference between the known output and the computed output converges to some given tolerance, arbitrarily defined to be 0.02 for this problem (sum-squared error of 0.02 is commonly used for normalised data in optimisation 9 ). For this initial investigation, it was decided to try and model the problem with 10 training pairs. These 10 training pairs to be used in training the ANN were created by interpreting (arbitrarily chosen) from LR Defect Data for bulk carriers 2 . The set of scaled training pairs is shown in Table 3 . Once trained, the ANN was applied to predict five different test cases. The computed outputs are shown in Table 4 , together with the actual output from LR defect database and the comparison made between them. It can be seen from the resting results of Table 4 that the ANN model does not predict 100% accurately the failure rate in all the five test cases. The error is between 0% and 11.9%. Though the ANN was trained with limited number of training pairs, the computed outputs were considered to be quite optimistic.
Novel risk assessment and decision support techniques for safety management systems ANN method provides a powerful tool that mimics the brain's way of processing low-level information, which has a great application potential in safety-based decision support. The single limitation in using this method is the availability of data for training the ANN model. Either the data available exists in the form that is far from cost-effective in extraction or it is completely unavailable. More exchange of information between classification societies, operators, insurance companies and effective database systems management are required to produce a more efficient safety decision support system. Another feasible way to enhance the strength of ANN technique in safety-based modelling is to amalgamate both the ANN and fuzzy set theories in a fuzzy neural network system.
A fuzzy-logic-based synthesis incorporating the Dempster-Shafer approach for making multipleattribute decisions
In decision-making there are always some parameters that are inaccurately known, implicating that the decision-making process must be based on subjective opinions. One of the most useful aspects of fuzzy set theory is its ability to represent mathematically a class of decision problems called multiple objective decisions, with involvement of many vague and ambiguous (and thus fuzzy) goals and constraints. The objective of the fuzzy set based decision methodology is to obtain an optimal decision in the sense that some set of goals is attained while observing (ie not violating) a simultaneous set of constraints. This paper presents a decisionmaking model as applied to multiple-attribute decision-making problems, which may be useful to decision makers in many realworld problems. The proposed decision-making framework is a synthesis using an approach developed by Zadeh and Bellman 24 and later extended by Yager 23 , together with the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 15 . While dealing with a multiple-attribute decision-making problem, the decision maker may have to compromise with available alternatives whereby none of which exactly satisfies his ultimate ideal best. The decision mechanism is constrained by the uncertainty and imprecision inherent in the determination of the relative importance of each attribute element and the classification of existing alternatives. The classification of alternatives is addressed through expert evaluation of the degree to which each attribute element is contained in each available alternative. The implementation of pairwise comparison and a ratio-scale quantification method by the decision maker is performed to determine the relative importance of each attribute element. Then the Belief and Plausibility that an alternative will satisfy the decision maker's ideal 'best' are derived and combined to rank the available alternatives.
A multiple-attribute decision-making framework 10. Rank alternatives in terms of Belief and sum of Belief and Plausibility, respectively. Then select the 'best' alternative with the highest evaluation.
The detail discussions on the framework can be found in Sii, et al 19 .
An illustrative example
In a formal safety assessment for a generic offshore support vessel, there are three Risk Control Options (RCOs) available to be considered. The main task for the designer is to compromise different degrees of attributes present in each RCO and select an optimal one based on the ideal 'best' criteria.
Each RCO is assigned a range of attributes to help analyse the effectiveness of each measure. These attributes are grouped into Novel risk assessment and decision support techniques for safety management systems CAA (Category A Attribute) and CBA (Category B Attribute). Each CAA relates to the fundamental type of risk reduction (prevention or mitigation), and each CBA relates to the type of action required (ie inherent, procedural or engineering) 7 . Risk Control Attributes have been included in the selection of the ideal 'best' RCOs for a generic type of offshore support vessel in this study. The attributes of importance to the decision maker/risk analyst to be considered in this case are the CAA and CBA only.
Suppose the evaluations of RCOs are: Based on the analysis using the proposed multiple-attribute decision-making framework, the following results are obtained.
The interval of uncertainty for each risk control option j is {Bel(RCOj), Pls(RCOj)}. Thus, the interval of uncertainty for the three options available are as follows:
RCO1 is {0.469, 0.476}; RCO2 is {0.428, 0.399}; and RCO3 is {0.524, 0.344}. The summary of Bel, Pls and Bel + Pls is shown in Table 5 . Based on the values of Bel + Pls, the ranking order of the three RCOs is:
The proposed decision support model is capable of simplifying the complex systems, pooling evidence or information from independent sources contributed by various experts, incorporating subjective factors in a systematic way, and addressing the uncertainty inherent in the decision-making process. This obviously computationally-intensive method, however, can be shown to be significantly faster if a hierarchical structure of evidence is present.
An integration of approximate reasoning approach and evidential reasoning method for risk analysis
This section presents a subjective safety model using approximate reasoning and evidential reasoning approaches for offshore engineering products. Approximate reasoning based on fuzzy logic approach, the technique bridging mathematical precision and vagueness of common-sense reasoning, employing fuzzy IF-THEN rules, can be used to model the qualitative aspects of human knowledge and reasoning processes without employing precise quantitative analyses. The evidential reasoning approach is used to synthesise the safety estimates in a hierarchical structure to obtain the safety evaluation of the whole system 17 .
A generic qualitative safety modelling framework incorporating approximate reasoning and evidential reasoning approaches for risk analysis
The proposed safety assessment framework for risk analysis is depicted in Fig 2 with the following steps: 1. Identify and name fuzzy input (ie, failure rate, consequence severity and failure consequence probability for safety modelling). 2. Identify and name fuzzy output/solution variables (ie, safety estimates). 3. Create the fuzzy membership functions for all the related input variables. 4. Construct the rule base. 5. Select fuzzy reasoning/inference mechanism. 6. Perform safety synthesis in a hierarchy using the evidential reasoning approach.
The three fundamental parameters used to assess the safety level of a maritime or offshore system on a subjective basis are failure rate, consequence severity and failure consequence probability. Safety estimate is the only output fuzzy variable used in this study to produce safety evaluation for each element at the bottom level of a hierarchical system. These variables are described linguistically as shown in Figs 3, 4, and 5, as well as in Tables 6, 7 and 8. In safety assessment, it is common to express a safety level by degrees to which it belongs to such linguistic variables as 'poor', 'fair', 'average', and 'good' that are referred to as safety expressions. A total number of 245 rules are developed as the rule base to carry out safety evaluation of a system. For instance, Rule No.1: IF failure rate is very low AND consequence severity is negligible AND failure consequence probability is highly unlikely THEN safety estimate is 'good'. The complete rule base is described in Sii 17 . In assessing the behaviour of an offshore structure, considerable sources of uncertainties are involved in the prediction of the environmental conditions to which the platform will be subjected during its lifetime 1, 10, 12, 16 . The biggest source of uncertainty in the assessment of jacket structures may come from the estimation of the environmental conditions and the determination of structural response to this loading. An example of the stability analysis of a reinforced support structure of an offshore platform shown in Fig  6 is used to demonstrate the proposed framework. In the example, there are two levels of the structural system to be considered as shown in Fig 7. The numerical numbers in Fig 7 show Novel risk assessment and decision support techniques for safety management systems
According to the generic qualitative safety model framework found in this section, the risk analysis of each element is first carried out using the safety model based on an approximate reasoning approach. Then a window-based and graphically-designed Intelligent Decision System (IDS) based on evidential reasoning approach is used to synthesise safety estimates. At the first stage, using the evidential reasoning safety synthesis for each element type is carried out by combining the elements belonging to that element type. Then, at the second stage, the safety estimate of the whole system is obtained by synthesising the information obtained at the previous stage.
The results obtained based on the above framework are given as follows:
Synthetic Safety estimate for Element Type 1 (ten elements): S(a 1 ) = {(0.1235, 'good'), (0.1570, 'average'), (0.5989, 'fair'), (0.1206, 'poor')} Synthetic Safety estimate for Element Type 2 (three elements): S(a 2 ) = {(0.0, 'good'), (0.0864, 'average'), (0.8359, 'fair'), (0.0277, 'poor')} Synthetic Safety estimate for Element Type 3 (eight elements): S(a 3 ) = {(0.0, 'good'), (0.3584, 'average'), (0.5804, 'fair'), (0.0612, 'poor')} Synthetic Safety estimate for Element Type 4 (four elements): S(a 4 ) = {(0.0, 'good'), (0.5896, 'average'), (0.4104, 'fair'), (0.0, 'poor')}
Whole system
Let ξ l be the relative weight of the l th element type. The relative weight represents the importance of the role the particular element type plays in evaluation of the safety of the whole system. The matrix ξ l can be expressed as follows:
Synthetic Safety estimate for the whole structure: S(y)= {(0.0443, 'good'), (0.1534, 'average'), (0.7198, 'fair'), (0.0635, 'poor')}.
From the above results, it is obvious that four failure events (ie element types (1), (2), (3) and (4)) have to a large extent been assessed as 'Fair'. The whole structure system has been assessed as 'Good' with a belief of 4.43%; as 'Average' with 15.34%, as 'Fair' with 71.98% and as 'Poor' with 6.35%.
The suggested modelling technique provides an effective tool for modelling complex engineering, management, decision-making problems in the absence of complete and precise information. The subjective judgment of experts who have used approximate reasoning approach produces better results than the objective manipulation of inexact data. This method requires an intensive computational work in the approximate reasoning process but this can be improved significantly if the algorithm is turned into a user-friendly software.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The safety culture in both the maritime and offshore industries has changed significantly in the UK over the past decade. In general, the introduction and enforcement of 'goal-setting' regimes, instead of a conventional prescriptive approach, provides maritime and offshore safety analysts with more flexibility to tackle safety problems. This also helps in promoting the development of novel safety assessment and safety-based decision support tools for safety management system. This paper has introduced the Taguchi philosophy in quality improvement in maritime safety engineering. It provides a basic understanding and skill in utilising the Taguchi concepts and methodologies in safety-related applications. A safety optimisation framework using Taguchi concepts is proposed and an application example is used to demonstrate how Taguchi concepts can be used to improve safety performance of a ship throughout its life-cycle via optimising its design features, operational characterRank Consequence Meaning (generic offshore severity structure interpretation) 1 Negligible Involving no injury and negligible damage to the system 2, 3
Marginal Minor system damage and/or minor injury. Operator will probably only notice a slight deterioration of the system performance. 4, 5, 6 Moderate Failure causes some operator dissatisfaction. Operator is made uncomfortable by failure (eg no light). Operator will notice some system performance deterioration.
7, 8
Critical Major system damage/or severe injury or occupational illness. High degree of operators dissatisfaction due to the nature of the failure such as an inoperable platform (eg drilling engine fails to start, power system failure) or an inoperable convenience subsystem (eg falling objects). 9, 10 Catastrophic System loss and/or death. Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode (eg blowout, fire and explosion) affects safe platform operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulations. Likely It is likely that consequences happen given that the failure event occurs (a program is not likely to detect a potential design weakness).
6,7
Reasonably It is reasonably likely that consequence occurs likely given the occurrence of the failure event caused by a potential design weakness. 8
Highly likely It is highly likely that consequence occurs given the occurrence of the failure event due to a highly likely potential design weakness.
9,10 Definite
The accident occurs given the occurrence of a failure event, due to a certainly potential design weakness. Novel risk assessment and decision support techniques for safety management systems istics and shipowner management quality. The results of this study show that the Taguchi methods may provide an alternative tool for risk analysis in maritime safety engineering. Safety analysts, designers, regulatory bodies, and ship managers may use this study and incorporate Taguchi methodology in their design, operation and decision-making processes to deal with safetyrelated matters. It has been noted that novel approaches such as ANNs techniques incorporated with access to a wider range of data than is presently published, would provide new insights into assessing and predicting the risks posed by ships with different characteristics. This will account for both technical design features as well as human factors and will permit more rational comparison between alternative ship design and operational features. It is worth noting that ANNs can be a potential tool for creating expert systems for selection and specification of a system in risk control measure evaluation.
The techniques illustrated in the section in which the Dempster-Shafer approach is incorporated for making multipleattribute decisions do not replace engineering judgements. However, the framework proposed and described provides a systematic approach to the often difficult process of selecting the ideal 'best' option among many alternatives in an uncertain environment.
The fourth novel safety assessment framework offers a great potential in safety assessment of offshore systems, especially in the initial concept design stages where the related safety information is scanty or with great uncertainty involved. Safety assessment using approximate reasoning approaches can formulate domain human experts' experience and safety engineering knowledge; at the same time, information of different properties from various sources can be transformed to become the knowledge base used in the fuzzy logic inference process. The result of this study has demonstrated that such a safety model provides safety analysts and designers with a convenient tool that can be used at various stages of the design process of offshore engineering systems in performing risk analysis. The method described forms a supplement to concepts and methodologies already in use for offshore safety assessment.
Results obtained in this study have contributed to the development of four novel tools for maritime safety management system. More thorough evaluation on a sufficiently large and realistic engineering system is required to validate the practicality and effectiveness of the developed tools. Several real-world marine and offshore systems such as an offshore platform and an offshore support vessel may be taken as test cases to refine and validate the developed methodologies. This will provide guidelines for the employment of them and also enable to direct the further development of suitable marine and offshore safety assessment and safety-based decision support techniques.
All the approaches presented in this paper can be integrated into formal safety assessment of any marine and offshore engineering products. With the domain-specific knowledge, they can also be tailored and applied to any system in other industries.
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